Blackout in Spain and Portugal: Latest update

Luis Badesa, Associate Professor at UPM



UNIVERSIDAD POLITÉCNICA DE MADRID

10th of May 2025



28th of April 2025 (CET)



Sources: <u>Red Eléctrica</u>, <u>ENTSO-E</u>, public data

Cause unknown

Two or more generators tripping almost simultaneously is considered a very unlikely event, as generator outages are assumed to be uncorrelated

This is why almost every system operator in the world sizes their reserve market for covering an N-1 contingency

(in Europe it is true that we cover an N-2 corresponding to 3 GW of Frequency-Containment Reserve, but this is for a huge interconnected power system, and only works if there is no loss of synchronism)



Cause unknown

Two contingencies happening in just 1.5 s means that **they are** somehow correlated

An N-2 event was the starting point of the 2019 GB power outage, and it was triggered by **lightning strikes**

We will have to wait to learn what caused the first outages in Spain



Voltage issues have been reported





Voltage for some lines

in Cuenca, <u>source</u>

Voltage issues have been reported

There have been reports of voltages reaching up to 470 kV in 400 kV **lines**, supposedly in the Southwest region where everything started

- I have not found data to support this claim, but the statement can be found in several news articles such as <u>this one</u> (in Spanish)
- Other mentions to overvoltages <u>here</u> and <u>here</u>

There could be a relation with the previous inter-area oscillations (this is completely speculative, but see next slide)



Voltage issues led to generation tripping in the Southwest of Spain just **3 months ago**

Almaraz nuclear plant (one reactor operating at 1 GW) tripped

Source

Oscillations are mentioned in the report for the January 2025 event (see above link)



Under-Frequency Load Shedding (12:33:18 - 12:33:21)

"Between 12:33:18 and 12:33:21 CET, the frequency of the Iberian Peninsula power system continued decreasing and reached 48,0 Hz. The automatic load shedding defence plans of Spain and Portugal were activated." (ENTSO-E, 9th of May)



Under-Frequency Load Shedding (12:33:18 - 12:33:21)

Why wasn't Under-Frequency Load Shedding (UFLS) effective enough?

Possible explanation:

Some Under-Frequency Load Shedding was reportedly triggered at 48 Hz (amount unknown). But the **net load disconnected could have been small**, as distributed generation could have been disconnected too (it was **noon on a** <u>sunny day</u> across a country with ~8 GW of rooftop solar PV)

Paper related to this topic <u>here</u>





Iberia becomes an electric island (12:33:20)



<u>Source</u> (behind a paywall, in Spanish)



Iberia is disconnected from the European synchronous area, as shown by the small frequency **bump** in France

Iberia becomes an electric island (12:33:20)

Confirmed cause (see <u>ENTSO-E</u>'s press release):

• Loss of synchronism due to phase angle deviations







<u>Source</u> (behind a paywall, in Spanish)

disconnection of generation

(as reported by Red Eléctrica)

This led to the full blackout

Personal hypothesis

Most generation could have tripped due to RoCoF relays

Once Iberia became an electric island, inertia was likely low

The Spanish grid had 59% solar PV generation and 11% wind generation right before the blackout (<u>source</u>, in Spanish)

 Generation in Europe is equipped with RoCoF-sensitive relays that are triggered for absolute values exceeding 1 Hz/s

 \succ Sources: <u>ENTSO-E</u> and <u>REE</u> (called "derivada de frecuencia" in the latter)



Personal hypothesis

Most generation could have tripped due to RoCoF relays





Related event: Iberia islanding in July 2021

Iberia became an **electric island** due to a fire in Southern France

Some load was disconnected (~6 GW)



Two options, either voltage issues or RoCoF issues (I see more likely the latter)

Graph: ENTSO-E

I think **RoCoF** is **more likely** than voltage issues for the final "massive disconnection of generation"

This is why:

 Voltage exceeding the critical value at the very same instant, for a wide geographical area that could simultaneously trip so much generation, seems less likely to me than RoCoF being the cause



Important update from 9th of May:

ENTSO-E places the full blackout at 12:33:24, 4 seconds later than 12:33:20

This means that **publicly available data from 12:33:20 onwards is** missing details

RoCoF could have been high during these few seconds (although overvoltages too)





SUMMARY

- Inter-area oscillations in Europe could have indirectly caused voltage problems in the South and Southwest of Spain (completely speculative)
- There were at least three losses of generation within a ~20s period, as seen in the frequency data, amounting to 2.2 GW
- First stage UFLS was triggered at 48 Hz. It could have been less effective due to distributed generation (completely speculative)
- Iberia losses synchronism and there is a "massive disconnection of generation". This leads to full blackout

 \succ The final massive loss of generation could be mostly due to **RoCoF relays tripping** (completely speculative)

Can we blame low inertia for the blackout?

NO

Maybe low inertia did eventually cause the final massive disconnection of generation, if my hypothesis about RoCoF-sensitive relays is correct (RoCoF is inversely proportional to inertia)

But the actual problem happened earlier: no TSO would carry sufficient inertia to withstand an N-3 generation contingency when operating as an electric island

